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THE “CRITICAL STAGE” AND EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

A “critical stage” of criminal prosecution denotes any formal or informal step of
the process, in or out of court, involving crucial confrontations between the accused
and the prosecution, when the absence of the accused’s counsel might affect their
right to a fair trial.1 These confrontations force the accused to make decisions that
can ultimately dictate their fate, and thus presence of counsel is of paramount
importance, even during the pretrial period. 2 Perhaps the most significant part of
that period is the plea-bargaining stage, when a defendant decides to plead guilty or
not guilty, shaping their fate before even stepping into the courtroom.3
The U.S. Supreme Court crafted the “critical stage” formulation in 1967,
recognizing that—in our modern criminal justice system—the time most critical for
a criminal defendant is the pretrial period, because it triggers the attachment of
constitutional rights.4 Even before that, in 1963, the Court’s ruling in Brady v.
Maryland established a defendant’s due process right to exculpatory evidence.5
Although the Court has not affirmatively extended that right to the pretrial stage,
pursuant to the principles underlying Brady and in an era when criminal justice is
equivalent to plea justice, a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to receive
exculpatory evidence must also extend to the pretrial period.
This Note addresses the circuit split on pretrial application of the Brady rule
stemming from varying interpretations of the 2002 case of United States v. Ruiz, the
Supreme Court’s most recent decision on the issue.6 First, this Note reviews the
evolution of due process and the Court’s Brady rule in Part II.A. Part II.B focuses on
1.

See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 226 (1967) (noting that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is construed to apply to “critical stages” of criminal proceedings and that “the accused . . . need
not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out,
where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial”).

2.

See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695–96 (2002) (citations omitted) (“A trial would be presumptively
unfair . . . where the accused is denied the presence of counsel at ‘a critical stage,’ . . . that [holds]
significant consequences for the accused.”); see also Wade, 388 U.S. at 224–25 (stating that a criminal
defendant is constitutionally entitled to adequate and effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages
of criminal proceedings).

3.

See Wade, 388 U.S. at 224 (“[T]oday’s law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the
accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the accused’s fate
and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.”); see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 141 (2012)
(citations omitted) (acknowledging that the Supreme Court has “made clear that ‘the negotiation of a
plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation’”).

4.

See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165 (2012) (“The Sixth Amendment requires effective assistance of
counsel at critical stages of a criminal proceeding. . . . The constitutional guarantee applies to pretrial
critical stages that are part of the whole course of a criminal proceeding, a proceeding in which
defendants cannot be presumed to make critical decisions without counsel’s advice.”); see also Wade, 388
U.S. at 224–25.

5.

See 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (establishing a criminal defendant’s due process right to obtain favorable,
“material” evidence and thereby creating a prosecutorial obligation to disclose such evidence to a
criminal defendant). Exculpatory evidence is “[e]vidence tending to establish a criminal defendant’s
innocence.” Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

6.

536 U.S. 622 (2002).
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the current role and requirements of plea-bargaining in the United States. The
Court’s decision in Ruiz and the current circuit split regarding Ruiz’s application to
exculpatory evidence are discussed in Part III. Part IV considers the impact of Ruiz
on the modern criminal justice system and argues that due process requires disclosure
of material exculpatory evidence before a defendant waives the right to trial and
enters a plea. Part V proposes a solution in two parts, derived from a critical analysis
of Ruiz, Brady, and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Part V.A suggests that Ruiz is
limited to the pre-indictment disclosure of impeachment information. Next, Part
V.B proposes an analytical framework, rooted in the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, that courts should adopt in extending the Brady rule to the “critical stage” of
plea-bargaining. Part VI concludes this Note.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

A. The Brady Rule

		

1. Pre-Brady: Due Process & The Role of a Prosecutor

In the Declaration of Independence, the Founders enshrined their belief that life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were among the inalienable rights given to all
men.7 Life, liberty, and property are further protected by the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.8
In the 1930s, the Supreme Court began to recognize the indispensable role of
due process in the criminal justice system.9 In Berger v. United States, the Court in
1935 established the fundamental principle that the role of a criminal prosecutor “is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”10 As a servant of the law, a
prosecutor must assure “that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.”11 Following
Berger, the Court decided two cases protecting criminal defendants against unfair
prosecutorial practices under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12

7.

See The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”).

8.

See U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .”); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).

9.

See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (“[I]t is the duty of the court . . . to assign counsel for [a
criminal defendant] as a necessary requisite of due process of law . . . .”). The Court’s test for determining
the existence of a criminal defendant’s unenumerated due process right is whether the right is among the
“fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions.” Id. at 67. (citations omitted).

10.

295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

11.

Id. The Court defined the purpose of criminal prosecution as a “legitimate means” to obtain a just and
accurate outcome. See id. (“It is . . . [the prosecution’s] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated
to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”).

12.

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
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The Court’s primary concern in these cases was the wrongful deprivation of a
person’s liberty at the hands of the criminal justice system.13
The two pre-Brady cases demonstrate the Court’s continuing effort to promote
honesty and transparency by maintaining governmental accountability under due
process. First, Mooney v. Holohan held in 1935 that a defendant is denied due process
of law when the prosecution knowingly presents false evidence at trial.14 Second,
Napue v. Illinois held in 1959 that a prosecutor’s deliberate failure to correct false
testimony violates due process, even when the testimony only affects witness credibility
and does not relate to substantive guilt or innocence.15 The Court was, over time,
expanding the duty of a prosecutor to encompass a truth-seeking function.16
		

2. Brady v. Maryland

In the landmark 1963 case Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court established a
criminal defendant’s constitutional right to obtain material exculpatory evidence
upon the defendant’s request.17 There, the prosecutor withheld extrajudicial
statements made by another individual confessing to the homicide.18 Defendant John
Brady learned of this favorable evidence after his own conviction was final.19 The
Court held that, regardless of whether the prosecution had acted in good faith, “the
suppression . . . of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.”20 The Brady doctrine
was derived from the Court’s belief that the disclosure of exculpatory evidence was

13.

Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112.

14.

See id. (explaining that the due process of law “cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and
hearing if a state has contrived a conviction [by] . . . means of depriving a defendant of liberty through
a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured.”). In
Mooney, the prosecution used perjured testimony to convict the defendant and suppressed evidence that
would have impeached that false testimony. Id. at 110–11. According to the Court, this deliberate
deception is “a means of depriving a defendant of liberty” and is further “inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of justice.” Id. at 112.

15.

Napue, 360 U.S. at 269. “The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence . . . [is] implicit
in any concept of ordered liberty” because “a defendant’s life or liberty may depend” on the jury’s
evaluation of a witness’ truthfulness and reliability. Id.

16.

See id. at 269–70 (quoting People v. Savvides, 136 N.E.2d 853, 854 (1956)) (“[T]he district attorney has
the responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth.”).

17.

373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

18.

Id. at 84.

19.

Id.

20. Id. at 87. See also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985) (noting that this constitutional

obligation the Court created in Brady was a “limited departure” from the “adversary model.”). However,
the Bagley court explained that the Brady rule’s “purpose is not to displace the adversary system as the
primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur.”
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.
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necessary to ensure that a criminal defendant was not deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.21
		

3. Post-Brady Developments

In later decisions, the Court expanded and defined the scope of the Brady
doctrine. In the 1972 case Giglio v. United States, the Court extended Brady to include
relevant impeachment information.22 There, the Court stated that the prosecution
must disclose all evidence that could be used to impeach a witness at trial when a
defendant’s guilt or innocence may rest on the reliability of that testimony.23 Failure
to disclose such evidence, said the Court, is a violation of due process.24
Next, in United States v. Agurs, the Court held in 1976 that prosecutors must
disclose Brady evidence even in the absence of a specific request by the defendant.25
The Court emphasized that its Brady decision was a product of the Court’s “overriding
concern with the justice of the finding of guilt.”26 Brady and Agurs thus marked a
shift in the Court’s concern from deterring prosecutorial misconduct to protecting
the defendant from harm.27 As a result, when the prosecution possesses evidence
“clearly supportive of a claim of innocence,” disclosure is necessary to prevent a
miscarriage of justice and uphold fundamental notions of “elementary fairness.”28
21.

See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87–88 (“Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal
trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”).

22.

405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)) (“When the ‘reliability
of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting
credibility falls within this general [Brady] rule.”). Impeachment evidence is “[e]vidence used to
undermine a witness’s credibility.” Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Impeachment
evidence often includes “impeachment information” which “has been generally defined as impeaching
information which is material to the defense,” and may include “specific instances of conduct of a
witness for the purpose of attacking the witness’ credibility or character for truthfulness;” “evidence in
the form of opinion or reputation as to a witness’ character for truthfulness;” “prior inconsistent
statements;” and “information that may be used to suggest that a witness is biased.” Policy Regarding the
Disclosure to Prosecutors of Potential Impeachment Information Concerning Law Enforcement Agency Witnesses
(“Giglio Policy”), Dep’t of Just. Archives: Off. of the Att’y Gen. (Dec. 9, 1996), https://www.
justice.gov/archives/ag/policy-regarding-disclosure-prosecutors-potential-impeachment-informationconcerning-law#:~:text=Each%20investigative%20agency%20employee%20is,its%20employees%20
fulfill%20this%20obligation (last updated Mar. 8, 2017).

23.

Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 269).

24.

Id. at 154–55.

25.

See 427 U.S. 97, 107–13 (1976). Recognizing that the prosecution does not have a constitutional duty “to
deliver [their] entire file to defense counsel,” the Court explained that prosecutors must disclose
evidence that is “of such substantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to be
disclosed even without a specific request,” to ensure that “ justice shall be done.” Id. at 110–11.

26. Id. at 112.
27.

See id. at 104 n.10 (“Although in Mooney the Court had been primarily concerned with the willful
misbehavior of the prosecutor, in Brady the Court focused on the harm to the defendant resulting from
nondisclosure.”).

28. Id. at 107, 110.
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And in 1985 in United States v. Bagley, the Court established the Brady materiality
standard. 29 According to the Court, Brady evidence is “material . . . if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.”30
Further, in 2004, the Court determined in Banks v. Dretke that a witness’ status
as a government informant is “material” for Brady purposes, and the prosecution’s
failure to disclose such information to a defendant violates due process.31 The Banks
Court emphasized that operating under a “‘prosecutor may hide, defendant must
seek’” rule “is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendants
due process.”32
B. Plea-Bargaining

Beginning in the 1970s with Santobello v. New York, the Supreme Court
encouraged the proper management of plea-bargaining, which had become “an
essential component of the administration of justice.”33
The plea-bargaining process is often a series of negotiations in which the
prosecutor offers the defendant a lesser charge or penalty in exchange for an
admission of guilt. 34 A guilty plea becomes the pretrial “disposition of criminal
29. 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
30. Id. The Bagley Court explained that “reasonable probability” in this context is defined “as ‘a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694 (1984)). The Bagley Court derived the Brady materiality standard from Strickland v. Washington,
which created a two-prong test to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 682. The
two-prong standard is laid out in Strickland as follows: “First, [a] defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient” (known as the “reasonableness” prong); “Second, [a] defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defen[dant]” (known as the “prejudice” prong). See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 691–96. The Court later explained that, in Strickland, “it had ‘relied on
and reformulated’ the test for materiality from Brady cases.” Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d
382, 409 (5th Cir. 2018) (Costa, J., dissenting) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 681). Ultimately, the Bagley
Court adopted the second prong of the reformulated Strickland test as the standard to determine the
materiality of Brady evidence. Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 409; see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (“We find the
Strickland formulation . . . for materiality sufficient[] . . . .”).

31.

Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 675–76 (2004).

32.

Id. at 696.

33.

404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970) (holding that a guilty plea
is constitutional under the Fifth Amendment despite a defendant’s subjective motivation for entering
the plea); see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (recognizing that “plea bargains have
become . . . central to the administration of the criminal justice system.”).

34. Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873, 875–76 (5th Cir. 1980). There are three main types of plea-bargaining:

charge bargaining, sentence bargaining, and count bargaining. Plea bargaining, Britannica, https://
www.britannica.com/topic/plea-bargaining (last visited Jan. 29, 2021). In charge bargaining, the
prosecution agrees to dismiss or reduce charges in exchange for a guilty plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
In sentence bargaining, the prosecution agrees to recommend a lesser sentence to the court in exchange for
a guilty plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B)–(C). In count bargaining, the prosecutor agrees to “drop any
charge or charges in exchange for a guilty plea on the remaining charges.” Plea bargaining, supra.
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charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused,”35 and its purpose is
to conserve government resources that would otherwise be spent on trial.36 A guilty
plea is thus more than just the admission of criminal culpability; “it is itself a
conviction” that supplies “both evidence and verdict, ending controversy.”37
		

1. Procedural Process

Absent certain procedural requirements, a court is not obligated to accept a guilty
plea.38 The procedural guidelines governing plea agreements in federal courts are
established in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.39 Under subsection
(b)(1), before a guilty plea is accepted, a court must be sure that a defendant
understands that they are waiving the following constitutional rights by pleading
guilty: “the right to a jury trial;” “the right to be represented by counsel . . . at trial
and at every other stage of the proceeding;” “the right at trial to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses, to be protected from compelled self-incrimination, to
testify and present evidence, and to compel the attendance of witnesses.”40
Additionally, “the court must address the defendant personally in open court and
determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises
(other than those in the plea agreement).”41 There must be a “factual basis for the
plea,” which the defendant must verbally convey to the judge.42 The court cannot
simply presume a valid waiver from a defendant’s silence.43 When all of these

35.

Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260.

36. See Frye, 566 U.S. at 144 (noting that plea agreements “benefit both parties” by “conserv[ing] valuable

prosecutorial resources” and providing defendants “more favorable terms at sentencing”); see also Frank,
646 F.2d at 876 (quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260) (“If every criminal charge were subjected to a fullscale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of
judges and court facilities.”).

37.

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 242 n.4 (1969) (quoting Woodward v. State, 171 So. 2d 462, 469
(Ala. Ct. App. 1965)).

38. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962) (“This does not mean . . . that a criminal defendant

has an absolute right to have his guilty plea accepted by the court.”).

39.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. State courts are not bound by the federal plea-taking procedures established in
Rule 11 because the federal rules of procedure do not govern state court proceedings. Miles v. Dorsey,
61 F.3d 1459, 1466–67 (10th Cir. 1995); Frank, 646 F.2d at 882; Wade v. Coiner, 468 F.2d 1059, 1060
(4th Cir. 1972). State courts must only ensure that guilty-plea proceedings satisfy due process
requirements. Miles, 61 F.3d at 1466–67; Frank, 646 F.2d at 882; Wade, 468 F.2d at 1060.

40. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(C)–(E).
41.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2).

42.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).

43.

See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (quoting Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516
(1962)) (explaining that the standard for determining whether a defendant waived their right to counsel
when remaining silent is “the same standard [that] must be applied [for] determining whether a guilty
plea was voluntarily made”—”[p]resuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible”).
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requirements are met, the court may accept a guilty plea and effectuate a valid waiver
of the defendant’s constitutional rights.44
		

2. The Knowing and Voluntary Requirement

Rule 11 codifies the requirements of understanding set forth in 1969 in Boykin v.
Alabama, which must be satisfied in order for a guilty plea to be constitutionally
valid.45 Under Boykin, courts determine the validity of a guilty plea by assessing
whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived their constitutional rights.46
If a guilty plea is not “equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in
violation of due process and is therefore void.”47 If both the knowing and voluntary
requirements are satisfied, a defendant has waived the right to collaterally challenge
a guilty plea.48
III. THE PROBLEM: UNITED STATES V. RUIZ

In 2002, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Ruiz that the Constitution
does not require the government to disclose impeachment information prior to
entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant; the Court’s holding was limited

44. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)–(3) (listing the requirements that must be met before accepting and entering

judgment on a guilty plea). “That a guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care
and discernment has long been recognized.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).

45.

See 395 U.S. at 244 (quoting Boykin v. State, 207 So. 2d 412, 415 (Ala. 1968) (Goodwyn, J., dissenting))
(determining that the record must show “that [a] defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered” a
guilty plea); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)–(2) (requiring that before accepting a guilty plea, a court
must find “that the defendant underst[ood the consequences of pleading guilty]” and “that the plea
[was] voluntary”). The knowing and voluntary standard for a valid plea “is rooted in the due process
clauses of the Constitution and is therefore applicable in both state and federal courts.” Frank v.
Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873, 882 (5th Cir. 1980).

46. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242. Supreme Court jurisprudence has defined the terms “knowing” and “voluntary.”

Brady, 397 U.S. at 748; McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). “Knowing” means an
“intelligent act[] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”
Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (footnote omitted). Specifically, a defendant pleading guilty must fully
understand the charges and the potential consequences of the plea. Id. at 748 n.6. Full awareness of
direct consequences “includ[es] the actual value of any commitments made to [a defendant] by the court,
prosecutor, or his own counsel.” Id. at 755 (citations omitted). “Voluntary” means “an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” and, therefore, implies that “the
defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.” McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). Notably, the term “intelligent” is
sometimes applied as part of the standard for validity of a guilty plea, either in place of “knowing” or as
a third requirement. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242, 244 (discussing whether the guilty plea was entered
“voluntarily,” “knowingly,” and “intelligently”).

47.

Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 n.5.

48. White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 421 (8th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) (“‘It is well settled that a

voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused person . . . may not be collaterally attacked.’”)
(emphasis in original).
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to impeachment information and did not encompass exculpatory evidence.49 Angela
Ruiz was charged with unlawful drug possession in the Southern District of
California after immigration agents found drugs in her luggage.50 Federal prosecutors
offered her a “fast track” plea bargain,51 which required the defendant to waive her
right to receive “impeachment information relating to any informants or other
witnesses.”52 The defendant refused the waiver, was indicted, and ultimately pleaded
guilty even though the plea agreement was no longer available.53 The district court
sentenced her in accordance with standard sentencing guidelines.54
The defendant appealed her sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which held that the prosecution’s “fast track” plea agreement violated the
defendant’s constitutional rights by requiring a waiver of the defendant’s right to
impeachment information.55 According to the Ninth Circuit, because a defendant is
constitutionally entitled to impeachment information before trial, it follows that they
are entitled to that same information before they enter into a plea agreement.56
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of “whether the Constitution
requires [the] preguilty plea disclosure of impeachment information”57 and held that
“the Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment
evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.”58
49. See 536 U.S. 622, 628–33 (2002) (recognizing that defendants may have a right to disclosure of

impeachment information in other stages of criminal proceedings but stating that “due process
considerations . . . argue against the existence of the [right to exculpatory and impeachment information]”
at the plea-bargaining stage).

50. Id. at 625.
51.

Id. The Ruiz Court explained that the “fast track” plea bargain is “standard in [the Southern District of
California]” and “asks a defendant to waive indictment, trial, and an appeal” in exchange for a lenient
sentence recommendation. Id. Conversely, a standard plea bargain is usually offered after a defendant is
indicted. See United States v. Ohiri, 133 F. App’x 555, 561–62 (10th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing Ruiz on the
basis, inter alia, that the “fast track” plea bargain occurred pre-indictment rather than post-indictment).

52.

Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625 (internal quotations omitted).

53.

Id. at 625–26. “[T]he prosecutors withdrew their bargaining offer” because Ruiz refused to waive her
“right to receive information supporting any affirmative defense [she would] raise[] if the case [went] to
trial,” resulting in Ruiz’s indictment for unlawful drug possession. Id. at 625.

54. Id. at 626. The United States Sentencing Guidelines provide the standard sentencing range for criminal

defendants convicted in U.S. federal courts. U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 1A1.1 (U.S. Sent’g
Comm’n 2018). If Ruiz had accepted the government’s plea bargain, her sentence range could have been
six months shorter than the sentence under the Guidelines, which specified eighteen to twenty-four
months for unlawful drug possession. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625.

55.

Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 626. Ruiz argued that her “right to receive undisclosed Brady evidence [could not] be
waived through [a] plea agreement[],” and that the government’s proposed plea agreement was
unconstitutional. United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2001).

56. See Ruiz, 241 F.3d at 1166–67 (“When there is not going to be a trial . . . as in the context of plea

bargaining, Brady evidence is only valuable to the accused if it is disclosed before acceptance of the plea
agreement.”) (emphasis in original).

57.

Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629.

58. Id. at 633.
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The Court’s reasoning was threefold. First, the Court stated that impeachment
information bears a “special . . . relation” to the “ fairness of a trial ” and not to the
voluntariness of a defendant’s plea.59 The Court determined that impeachment
information is not “critical” at the plea stage because “[t]he degree of help that
impeachment information can provide will depend upon the defendant’s own
independent knowledge of the prosecution’s potential case—a matter that the
Constitution does not require prosecutors to disclose.”60
Second, relying on precedent, the Court reasoned that a guilty plea may be
constitutionally valid despite a defendant’s misapprehension of certain relevant
circumstances. 61 The Court classified impeachment information as one such
circumstance, after concluding that a defendant’s ignorance of such information
during the plea-bargaining phase is minimal in terms of importance.62
Finally, the Court reasoned that due process considerations weigh against
disclosure of impeachment information.63 The Court noted that a constitutional
obligation to provide impeachment information during plea-bargaining could impede
the government’s interest in “the efficient administration of justice.”64 Specifically,
requiring the government to disclose witness information prematurely has the
potential to increase the resources the government must utilize in pretrial preparation,
thereby negating the “main resource-saving advantages” of plea-bargaining.65
Additionally, “premature disclosure of Government witness information . . . could
‘disrupt ongoing investigations’ and expose prospective witnesses to serious harm.”66
Thus, the Court concluded that the minimal benefits of pre-plea disclosure of
impeachment information are substantially outweighed by the potential risks.67
59.

Id. at 629 (emphasis in original).

60. Id. at 630.
61.

Id. The Ruiz Court cited four cases in which the Court upheld a guilty plea despite the defendant’s
ignorance of certain circumstances: United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573 (1989) (counsel “failed to
point out a potential defense”); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (counsel “failed to find a
potential constitutional infirmity in grand jury proceedings”); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757
(1970) (the defendant “misapprehended the quality of the State’s case” and “the likely penalties,” and
“failed to anticipate a change in the law regarding relevant punishments”); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 770 (1970) (counsel “misjudged the admissibility of a confession”). Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630–31
(internal quotations omitted).

62. See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630–31 (“[I]n any case, as the proposed plea agreement at issue here specifies, the

Government will provide ‘any information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant’
regardless. That fact, along with other guilty-plea safeguards . . . diminishes the force of Ruiz’s concern
that, in the absence of impeachment information, innocent individuals . . . will plead guilty.”).

63. Id. at 631.
64. Id.
65.

Id. at 631–32.

66. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States at 25, Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (No. 01-595), 2002 WL 316340).
67.

See id. at 632 (“We cannot say that the Constitution’s due process requirement demands so radical a
change in the criminal justice process in order to achieve so comparatively small a constitutional benefit.”).
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The Ruiz Court focused on impeachment information but left open the question
of whether exculpatory evidence must be disclosed to a criminal defendant prior to
the entry of a guilty plea. The Court has yet to clarify whether its holding in Ruiz
extends to exculpatory evidence.68 With circuit courts split on this question, a
criminal defendant’s constitutional right to exculpatory evidence is contingent on the
jurisdiction in which a prosecution takes place.69
IV.	THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALLOWING PROSECUTORS TO SUPPRESS
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE DURING PLEA-BARGAINING

Given the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, jurisdictions vary as to
whether prosecutors provide the defense with exculpatory evidence.70 In practice,
federal prosecutors have vast discretion in determining whether to disclose pre-plea
exculpatory evidence under Brady.71 Some circuit courts have incorrectly interpreted
Ruiz as a blanket denial of Brady rights during the plea-bargaining process.72 By
68. United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010).
69. Compare Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 154 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that there is no constitutional

right to Brady material prior to the entry of a guilty plea), and United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174,
179 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that the government is not obligated to hand over exculpatory information
before the defendant pleads guilty), with McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the government is required to disclose material exculpatory information prior to a guilty
plea if the information is proof “of a criminal defendant’s factual innocence”), and Sanchez v. United
States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that withholding exculpatory evidence automatically
renders a guilty plea unknowing and involuntary).

70. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also Editorial, Beyond the Brady Rule, N.Y. Times (May 18,

2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/opinion/sunday/beyond-the-brady-rule.html (“It might
seem obvious that prosecutors . . . would inform a defendant’s lawyer of evidence that could be favorable
to the defendant’s case. But . . . this principle, known as the Brady rule, has been restricted by subsequent
rulings of the court and have been severely weakened . . . .”).

71.

See generally Kate Weisburd, Prosecutors Hide, Defendants Seek: The Erosion of Brady Through the
Defendant Due Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 138, 141–42 (2012) (exploring “the disjuncture
between” Brady jurisprudence, the “defendant due diligence rule,” and the “reality of criminal practice”).
The term “defendant due diligence rule” reflects “the common modern tendency of [federal] courts to
excuse” a prosecutor’s “failure to disclose exculpatory evidence [which is otherwise “subject to disclosure
under Brady”] on the theory that the defendant either knew or could have known of that evidence
through due diligence.” Id. at 141–42 (“Every federal court of appeals, except for the Tenth and D.C.
Circuits, applies some form of [the defendant due diligence rule].”). This rule “shift[s] the burden of
discovery to the defendant and suggest[s] that the government’s disclosure duty is not absolute,”
therefore undermining the Brady rule requirement “that prosecutors provide broad, timely, and absolute
disclosure of all material exculpatory evidence.” Id. at 158. The tension between the Brady rule and the
due diligence rule thus leaves prosecutors with “even more discretion” and “additional justifications . . .
to withhold exculpatory evidence” because they get to decide which “evidence is material [and] whether
[that] evidence is sufficiently available to a diligent defendant.” Id. at 159. See Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 88 (1963) (defining a prosecutor as the “architect of a proceeding”); see also Lafler v. Cooper,
566 U.S. 156, 185 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that plea-bargaining “presents grave risks of
prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compels an innocent defendant to avoid massive risk by
pleading guilty to a lesser defense”).

72. See Conroy, 567 F.3d at 179 (holding that “Ruiz never makes . . . a distinction [between impeachment

evidence and exculpatory evidence] nor can this proposition be implied from its discussion”); see also
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extending Ruiz to exculpatory evidence, these circuit courts have ignored the modern
realities of the American criminal justice system, which “is for the most part a system
of pleas, not a system of trials.” 73 Although historically, a trial was the forum to
determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence,74 the current criminal justice system
increasingly utilizes plea-bargaining, potentially determining a defendant’s fate well
ahead of the trial.75 Notably, between July, 2019 and June, 2020, more than 98
percent of federal convictions resulted from guilty pleas, meaning that a mere 2
percent of federal criminal proceedings went to trial.76 To confine Brady’s application
to only 2 percent of criminal defendants would needlessly limit its principles of
fairness and transparency. Given the prevalence of plea-bargaining and its effect on
the outcome in the vast majority of cases, Brady must extend beyond the confines of
a criminal trial.77
Moreover, by allowing the government to withhold exculpatory evidence from a
criminal defendant during plea-bargaining, circuit courts deprive defendants of the
ability to make a knowing and voluntary decision to forgo trial.78 The Supreme
Court noted that the “negotiation of a plea . . . is almost always the critical point for
United States v. Mathur, 624 F.3d 498, 507 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding that “[t]he Ruiz Court evinced a
reluctance to extend a Brady-like right to the realm of pretrial negotiations[.]”); see also Friedman, 618
F.3d at 154 (citations omitted) (“[T]he Supreme Court has consistently treated exculpatory and
impeachment evidence in the same way for the purpose of defining the obligations of a prosecutor to
provide Brady materials prior to trial . . . .”); see also Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 285–86 (describing the Brady
right to material exculpatory evidence as a trial right and reasoning that Ruiz and other Supreme Court
cases indicate that due process does not require that a defendant receive all useful information prior to a
guilty plea) (emphasis omitted).
73. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170.
74.

See id. at 186 (defining the “gold standard of American justice” as “a full-dress criminal trial”); see also
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.

75. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012).
76. See U.S. District Courts—Criminal Defendants Terminated, by Type of Disposition and Offense—During the

12-Month Period Ending June 30, 2020, U.S. Cts.: Stat. Tables for the Fed. Judiciary (June 30,
2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-4/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2020/06/30
(reporting that for the period between June 30, 2019 and June 20, 2020 there were 74,056 total
convictions and of those, 72,683 were from guilty pleas); see also John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal
Criminal Defendants Go to Trial, and Most Who Do Are Found Guilty, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (June 11, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-totrial-and-most-who-do-are-found-guilty/ (providing statistics from state and federal courts to explain
the rarity of acquittals in each).

77.

See McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is highly likely that the Supreme
Court would find a violation of the Due Process Clause if prosecutors or other relevant government
actors have knowledge of a criminal defendant’s factual innocence but fail to disclose such information
to a defendant before he enters into a guilty plea.”).

78. At least two circuits have held that a defendant’s guilty plea is neither knowing nor voluntary if it was

made in the absence of withheld Brady material. See Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding that withholding exculpatory evidence automatically renders a guilty plea
unknowing and involuntary); see also Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[W]e
conclude that even a guilty plea that was ‘knowing’ and ‘intelligent’ may be vulnerable to challenge if it
was entered without knowledge of material evidence withheld by the prosecution.”).
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a defendant” because it is the defendant’s only opportunity to decide whether to
waive fundamental constitutional rights otherwise inherent in a criminal trial.79 This
decision is primarily based on the perceived strength of the government’s case and
the defendant’s awareness of favorable evidence that tends to prove their innocence.80
Thus, the early disclosure of exculpatory evidence helps a defendant to make an
informed decision regarding their plea.81 A holding to the contrary curtails the
defendant’s ability to do so.82
Finally, by extending Ruiz to exculpatory evidence, circuit courts have prioritized
the government’s administrative efficiency over its profound obligation to seek justice
and truth. While it is modern practice for the federal government to offer criminal
defendants lenient plea bargains to avoid spending time, money, and resources on a
trial,83 the courts have long recognized that plea offers may induce innocent people to
plead guilty to avoid the risk of receiving a harsher penalty at trial.84 With no clear
rule requiring the pre-plea disclosure of exculpatory evidence, prosecutors are
incentivized to withhold material exculpatory evidence in an effort to secure a guilty
plea. It is implausible to suggest that this was the Court’s intended result in Ruiz.85
Further, the concealment of such evidence undermines the transparency of our

79. Frye, 566 U.S. at 144.
80. See Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453 (quoting Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320) (“[A] defendant’s decision whether or not

to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by his appraisal of the prosecution’s case”).

81.

See United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796, 804–05 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The Government’s obligation to
disclose Brady material is pertinent to the accused’s decision to plead guilty; the defendant is entitled to
make that decision with full awareness of favorable (exculpatory and impeachment) evidence known to
the Government.”); see also Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320, 1322 (“[E]ven where counsel would likely adhere to
his recommendation of a plea of guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity, if there is a reasonable
probability that but for the withholding of the information the accused would not have entered the
recommended plea but would have insisted on going to a full trial, the withheld information is material
within the meaning of the Brady v. Maryland line of cases.”).

82. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 307–08 (1930) (noting that defendants have the ability to

waive their constitutional rights, but that doing so should be based upon sound knowledge and advice).

83. See Off. of U.S. Att’ys, Justice 101: Plea Bargaining, U.S. Dep’t. of Just., https://www.justice.gov/usao/

justice-101/pleabargaining (last visited Jan. 29, 2021) (“When the Government has a strong case, the
Government may offer the defendant a plea deal to avoid trial and perhaps reduce his exposure to a more
lengthy sentence.”); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 169 (2012).

84. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 719 n.5 (1948) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted) (“‘[T]here

may be circumstances which may induce an innocent man to accuse himself.’”); see also United States v.
Fine, 975 F.2d 596, 604 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“A plea to some charges in exchange for dismissal of
others may sometimes produce little benefit, but . . . [o]verly lenient plea bargains may induce innocent
defendants to plead guilty[.]”); see also United States v. Int’l Paper Co., 457 F. Supp. 571, 576 (S.D. Tex.
1978) (“[P]lea bargaining . . . creates the possibility that an innocent person may plead guilty out of fear
of conviction and a harsher sentence.”).

85. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628–29 (2002) (recognizing that because pleading guilty waives

several constitutional rights, the defendant must only enter a guilty plea voluntarily and must waive such
constitutional rights “knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences”); see also McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2003).
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criminal justice system and obstructs governmental accountability.86 The disclosure of
exculpatory evidence generally depends on the good faith and integrity of the
prosecutor.87 Therefore, it is imperative for the Court to incentivize proper prosecutorial
behavior by requiring all prosecutors to comply with early disclosure obligations.88
V.	THE SOLUTION: MANDATING THE DISCLOSURE OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
AT PLEA-BARGAINING

The absence of a holding directly addressing a prosecutor’s obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence during plea-bargaining deprives some defendants of crucial
constitutional protections. The solution to this problem should be consistent with
fairness principles underlying Brady and should acknowledge the modern realities of
the American criminal justice system. This Note proposes a two-part solution. First,
Part V.A suggests that the holding in Ruiz is limited to the pre-indictment disclosure
of only impeachment information. Second, Part V.B proposes an analytical
framework, rooted in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, that courts should
adopt in extending Brady rights and obligations to the pretrial process.
A. The Proposed Ruiz Rule

Circuit courts are split on whether Ruiz applies to only impeachment information,
only exculpatory evidence, or both.89 A critical reading of the Court’s opinion resolves
this ambiguity—Ruiz was clearly intended to be limited to impeachment information
in the context of pre-indictment pleas.

86. Justin Murray, Prejudice-Based Rights in Criminal Procedure, 168 U. Penn. L. Rev. 277, 314 (2020); see

also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) (“In my view, a civilized
society must maintain its capacity to discover transgressions of the law and to identify those who flout
it.”).

87.

See Editorial, Beyond the Brady Rule, supra note 70 (“It is impossible to know how often prosecutors
violate Brady since this type of misconduct, by definition, involves concealment.”).

88. The American Bar Association (ABA) has promulgated professional rules of conduct and ethics for

attorneys, which evidence a clear trend towards transparent discovery, even at the plea-bargaining stage.
See Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 3.8 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1983). The ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice also provide that requiring early disclosure obligations from prosecutors would “promote a fair
and expeditious disposition of charges . . . [and] provide . . . defendants with sufficient information to
make . . . informed plea[s].” Standards for Criminal Justice Discovery and Trial by Jury,
Standard 11-1.1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1996).

89. Compare Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 154 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that there is no constitutional

right to Brady material prior to the entry of a guilty plea), and United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174,
179 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that the government is not obligated to hand over exculpatory information
before the defendant pleads guilty), with McCann, 337 F.3d at 787 (holding that the government is
required to disclose material exculpatory information prior to a guilty plea if the information is proof “of
a criminal defendant’s factual innocence”), and Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that withholding exculpatory evidence automatically renders a guilty plea unknowing
and involuntary).
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First, the main issue in Ruiz was “whether the Constitution requires [the]
preguilty plea disclosure of impeachment information.”90 Exculpatory evidence was
neither at issue nor discoverable because the defendant’s guilt was undisputed.91 The
only contested issue was the disclosure of impeachment information that could be
used in a potential future trial.92 Consistent with this premise, the Ruiz Court
explicitly distinguished impeachment information from exculpatory evidence93 in
two ways: first, the Court said that “impeachment information is special in relation
to the fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary;” and, second,
that a defendant’s awareness of impeachment information is not critical prior to a
guilty plea.94
The Court formulated these distinctions by analyzing the “degree of help” that
impeachment information would provide to a defendant at the plea stage.95 Under
the “degree of help” analysis, the prosecution’s duty to disclose evidence turns on
how helpful that evidence is to the defendant during the particular stage of the
proceedings.96 Here, the Court concluded that impeachment information constitutes
trial-related evidence that provides minimal, if any, “degree of help” to the defendant
during the plea-bargaining stage.97 The Court explained that because impeachment
information can only be used against a prosecution’s witness at trial, the usefulness of
impeachment information depends on the prosecution’s trial strategy,98 and is
relevant only if the prosecution decides to call a particular witness.99 The prosecution,
90. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629. The Court concluded that the Constitution did not require the pre-guilty plea

disclosure of impeachment information. Id. In reaching that conclusion, the Court “primarily
consider[ed] whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require[d] federal prosecutors, before entering
into a binding plea agreement with a criminal defendant, to disclose ‘impeachment information relating
to any informants or other witnesses.’” Id. at 625 (citation omitted).

91.

Id. at 634 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)) (“The principle
supporting Brady was ‘avoidance of an unfair trial of the accused.’ That concern is not implicated at the
plea stage regardless.”).

92.

Id. at 629.

93.

The Court defined exculpatory evidence as “evidence the suppression of which would ‘undermine
confidence in the verdict,’” and which “includes ‘evidence affecting’ witness ‘credibility,’ where the
witness’ ‘reliability’ is likely ‘determinative of guilt or innocence.’” Id. at 628 (citations omitted). The
Court defined impeachment information as evidence that provides a defendant with “grounds for
impeachment of potential witnesses at a possible future trial.” Id. at 631.

94. Id. at 629–30 (emphasis in original).
95. Id.
96. See id. at 633 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Court . . . suggests that the constitutional analysis turns in

some part on the ‘degree of help’ . . . [impeachment] information would provide to the defendant at the
plea stage . . . .”).

97.

See id. at 631 (recognizing that “the added value of the Ninth Circuit’s ‘right’ to [receive impeachment
information from the prosecution during the plea-bargaining stage] is often limited” and other “guiltyplea safeguards” already exist to prevent innocent defendants from pleading guilty).

98. See id.
99. The federal Justice Manual, formerly known as the United States Attorneys’ Manual (USAM) and

revised and renamed in 2018, explicitly recognizes that impeachment information “depends on the
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however, is not required to disclose its witness list to a defendant until immediately
before trial.100 As such, the value of impeachment information at plea-bargaining is
speculative and uncertain; it merely provides the defendant with information about
“potential witnesses at a possible future trial.”101 Therefore, the Court concluded that
a defendant is not entitled to impeachment information during plea-bargaining
because of the “random way in which such information may, or may not, help a
particular defendant” at any stage of prosecution.102
The Court’s “degree of help” analysis changes greatly in the context of substantive
exculpatory evidence.103 Exculpatory evidence is substantive in nature because it
independently proves or tends to prove a defendant’s innocence.104 Conversely,
impeachment information is collateral in nature because it is merely responsive to the
government’s case105 and becomes relevant only to discredit the government’s

prosecutor’s decision on who is or may be called as a government witness,” thus, the purpose of disclosure
is “to allow the trial to proceed efficiently.” U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-5.001(D)(2) (2018).
The manual current at the time of Ruiz—the USAM—provided the same substantive information. See
U.S Dep’t of Just., U.S. Att’ys’ Manual § 9-5.001(D)(2) (1997).
100. See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631–32 (citations omitted) (acknowledging that based on the codified “legal

Government witness disclosure requirements,” Congress and the Federal Rules Committees have
already recognized that requiring the government to disclose its witness list too early would “expose
prospective witnesses to serious harm”); see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2020) (allowing the government to
disclose its witness list in capital cases as little as three days before trial). According to the federal Justice
Manual, the government is required to disclose impeachment information “at a reasonable time before
trial.” U.S Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-5.001(D)(2) (2018) (ref lecting the same substantive
information as the USAM).

101. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631. Because impeachment information relates to the credibility of government

witnesses, such evidence is only helpful if the government decides to call that particular witness at trial. Id.
Therefore, courts have found that the government need only disclose impeachment information “the day
the witness testifies, because disclosure at that time will fully allow the defendant to effectively use the
information to challenge the veracity of the government’s witnesses.” United States v. Lujan, 530 F. Supp.
2d 1224, 1255–56 (D.N.M. 2008) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Montoya, 161 F.
3d 643, 649–50 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that delayed disclosure of impeachment information did not
violate the Brady rule as the “untimely disclosure did not affect the results of the proceeding because
defense counsel had an opportunity to review the new evidence and question [the witness] about it”).

102. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629–30.
103. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963).
104. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (“The jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability

of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as
the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life or liberty may depend.”)
(emphasis omitted).

105. See Lujan, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1255–56 (finding that impeachment information is only used “to challenge

the veracity of the government’s witnesses” at trial; therefore, disclosure of such information on the day
the witness testifies is sufficient for Brady purposes); see also Collateral, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
ed. 2019) (defining collateral as “[s]upplementary; accompanying, but secondary and subordinate”).
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witnesses at trial.106 Exculpatory evidence, however, is always relevant regardless of
the government’s trial strategy.107
This important distinction between exculpatory evidence and impeachment
information is implicitly recognized in the Ruiz dicta.108 The Court explained that
the mandatory disclosure of exculpatory evidence helps mitigate the risk that
“innocent individuals . . . will plead guilty.”109 This reinforces the idea that, unlike
impeachment information, exculpatory evidence constitutes “critical information”
that a defendant must be aware of, so that the possibility of a wrongful conviction is
diminished.110
Further, exculpatory evidence is especially important because of the voluntary
nature of a guilty plea.111 The Ruiz Court determined that a defendant’s pretrial
106. See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 623 (emphasis in original).
107. See Lujan, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1255 (“Exculpatory evidence will usually require significant pretrial

investigation to be useful to a defendant at trial, and thus, disclosure should generally be required well
before pure Giglio impeachment evidence, which usually does not require substantial time to prepare for
its effective use at trial.”); see also United States v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 780, 788–89 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(requiring production of impeachment material at least three days in advance of jury selection); see also
United States v. Aiken, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1344–45 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (ordering the government to
produce impeachment material ten days before trial). Whereas impeachment information could
undermine a witness’s credibility, exculpatory evidence could undermine the accuracy and reliability of
the entire criminal proceeding itself. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 113 (recognizing that
exculpatory evidence of even “minor importance” may be “sufficient to create a reasonable doubt” about
the defendant’s guilt “if the verdict is already of questionable validity”).

108. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631. The Ruiz Court found that due process considerations were satisfied because the

plea agreement required the government to disclose all exculpatory evidence prior to defendant’s plea.
Id. Specifically, “the proposed plea agreement at issue here specifies [that] the Government will provide
‘any [known] information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant’” and “it acknowledges
the Government’s ‘continuing duty to provide such information.’” Id. at 625 (internal quotations
omitted) (alteration in original).

109. See id. at 631 (explaining that the concern that “innocent individuals . . . will plead guilty” is diminished

due to the requirement that “the Government provide ‘any information establishing the factual
innocence of the defendant,’” in addition to the “other guilty plea safeguards” required under Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).

110. See id. at 630–31. The Ruiz Court’s concern that innocent people are wrongfully pleading guilty is a

legitimate one that too often is a reality in the modern criminal justice system. See Michael O.
Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 293, 293
(1975) (noting that the Court approves “the practice of plea bargaining” because of “the assumption that
defendants who were convicted on the basis of negotiated pleas of guilt would have been convicted had
they elected to stand trial” and “conclud[ing] that the fundamental assumption underlying the Court’s
approval of plea bargaining is incorrect.”). As of December 2020, forty-four of 375 DNA exonerations
in the United States involved defendants who had pled guilty without the benefit of that evidence, to
crimes they did not commit. DNA Exonerations in the United States, Innocence Project, https://
innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2021). See also Kevin
C. McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrong ful Convictions, 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 651,
656–62 (2007) (explaining how the pre-plea disclosure of exculpatory evidence can reduce the risk of
innocent people pleading guilty).

111. See State v. Huebler, 275 P.3d 91, 97–98 (Nev. 2012) (“While the value of impeachment information

may depend on innumerable variables that primarily come into play at trial and therefore arguably make
it less than critical information in entering a guilty plea, the same cannot be said of exculpatory
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ignorance of impeachment information is minimal “in terms of importance.”112
Meanwhile, exculpatory evidence is the most important evidence because it speaks
directly to a defendant’s innocence;113 a defendant’s knowledge or ignorance of
exculpatory evidence significantly impacts their decision to plead guilty.114 Notably,
the Ruiz Court also conceded that “the more information the defendant has” before
making a decision to plea or waive rights, “the wiser that decision will likely be.”115 It
is logical to conclude that the “more information” denotes exculpatory evidence, as
opposed to the less important impeachment information.
Additionally, the Ruiz Court also engaged in a balancing test and concluded that
the minimal benefits of disclosing impeachment information before trial were
substantially outweighed by government interests.116 The Court emphasized that
premature disclosure of impeachment information could “disrupt ongoing
investigations,” “expose prospective witnesses to serious harm,” and waste substantial
government resources on pre-plea trial preparation.117 In contrast, the value of
exculpatory evidence far outweighs governmental interests because exculpatory
evidence can potentially salvage an innocent man’s liberty. This interpretation is
supported by federal policy.118 Therefore, the balancing test in Ruiz is inapplicable to
exculpatory evidence, which should almost always be disclosed without judicial
balancing of various interests and factors.119
Finally, the Ruiz Court’s primary concern in rejecting the idea of mandatory
disclosure of impeachment information at plea-bargaining was the possibility that
information, which is special not just in relation to the fairness of a trial but also in relation to whether
a guilty plea is valid and accurate.”).
112. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630–32.
113. See United States v. Nelson, 979 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting that any “defendant who

is forced to make a choice about going to trial or pleading guilty unaware that the government has not
disclosed” evidence speaking directly to the defendant’s innocence “suffers unfair treatment unworthy
of the bedrock ideal inscribed on the Justice Department walls.”).

114. See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the prosecutorial obligation

to disclose Brady material “is pertinent not only to an accused’s preparation for trial but also to his
determination of whether or not to plead guilty,” and that defendants are “entitled to make that decision
with full awareness of favorable material evidence known to the government”).

115. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629.
116. Id. at 632–33.
117. Id. at 632.
118. Federal policy allows the pretrial disclosure of impeachment information only after the prosecutor

“balance[s] the goals of early disclosure against other significant interests—such as witness security and
national security.” U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-5.001(D)(2) (2018). This policy imposes no
balancing test restriction on the pretrial disclosure of exculpatory evidence, which “must be disclosed
reasonably promptly after it is discovered.” U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-5.001(D)(1) (2018).

119. Pursuant to federal policy, there is only one exception that allows the application of a balancing test to

exculpatory information. That exception pertains to “classified or otherwise sensitive national security
material,” which may “require certain protective measures that may cause disclosure to be delayed or
restricted (e.g. pursuant to the Classified Information Procedures Act.)” U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just.
Manual § 9-5.001(D)(1) (2018).
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mandating such disclosure “could require the Government to devote substantially
more resources to trial preparation prior to plea bargaining.”120 But this concern is
limited to the type of plea agreement used in Ruiz, which was a pre-indictment “fasttrack” plea.121 In the post-indictment context, the Court’s concern with burdening the
prosecutor unnecessarily early in trial preparation would not exist because postindictment pleas occur after the prosecution has already collected the evidence
necessary to indict the defendant;122 it would be fair to expect that a prosecutor has
already gathered the evidence necessary to bring the defendant to trial.123
Even if a court were to consider the burden on the government and the potential
waste of resources posed by the pre-plea disclosure of exculpatory evidence in the
post-indictment context, these burdens are substantially outweighed by the potential
of the defendant’s wrongful loss of liberty that may result from non-disclosure.
Accordingly, Ruiz must be limited to the pre-indictment disclosure of impeachment
information only.
B. The Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel

In addition to limiting the application of Ruiz, the courts should extend Brady to
pretrial proceedings. A criminal defendant’s due process right to receive Brady
evidence and the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel have been
inextricably linked throughout Supreme Court jurisprudence and are considered trial

120. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 632.
121. Id. at 629.
122. See 2 David S. Rudstein et al., Criminal Constitutional Law § 9.05 (LexisNexis 2020) (“An

indictment is a written accusation of a crime found by a grand jury and presented by it to a court. The
underlying charge is proffered to the grand jury by the prosecutor.”); see also Off. of the U.S. Att’ys,
Justice 101: Charging, U.S. Dep’t of Just., https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/charging (last
visited Jan. 29, 2021) (explaining that to obtain an indictment, the prosecutor must “present the
evidence” and “outline . . . the case” to an impartial grand jury and the grand jury “then votes . . . on
whether they believe that enough evidence exists to charge the person with a crime”).

123. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689–90 (1972) (holding that an indictment “marks the commencement

of the ‘criminal prosecution[]’” because “the government has committed itself to prosecute” and “the
adverse positions of [the] government and defendant have solidified”); see also Dickey v. Florida, 398
U.S. 30, 38 (1970) (“[T]he right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental . . . .”). The
Tenth Circuit has recognized that the Ruiz rationale is limited to pre-indictment pleas. See United
States v. Ohiri, 133 F. App’x 555, 561–62 (10th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing the defendant’s plea
agreement from the defendant’s plea agreement in Ruiz). In Ohiri, the Tenth Circuit held that the
government should have disclosed all known exculpatory evidence before the defendant pled guilty
because, unlike in Ruiz, the plea agreement occurred post-indictment, “not before indictment in
conjunction with a ‘fast-track’ plea.” Id. at 562. The Tenth Circuit noted that, in Ruiz, “the Supreme
Court did not imply that the government may avoid the consequence of a Brady violation if the defendant
accepts an eleventh-hour plea agreement while ignorant of withheld exculpatory evidence in the
government’s possession.” Id. This interpretation is further supported by federal policy, which requires
a prosecutor to disclose “substantial evidence that directly negates the guilt” of a defendant to the grand
jury at the point of indictment. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-11.233 (2018).
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rights.124 Further, the Sixth Amendment, like the Due Process Clause, serves to
ensure the accuracy and reliability of criminal convictions.125 Finally, courts apply
the same Strickland materiality standard to assess whether a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment and due process rights were violated.126 Based on these similarities, it is
logical to conclude that the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence is equally
applicable to pre-plea Brady disclosures.127
Although the Court has not yet extended Brady rights to pretrial proceedings, it
has extended the right to effective assistance of counsel to “various pretrial ‘critical’
interactions between the defendant and the State.”128 In 1964, in Massiah v. United
States, the Court established a defendant’s right to be protected by counsel even during
pretrial interrogation.129 The Court reasoned that the interrogation of an already
indicted defendant without the presence of counsel “contravenes the basic dictates of
fairness . . . and the fundamental rights of persons charged with crime.”130 Although
the Constitution guarantees the aid of counsel at trial, the Massiah Court determined
that the “most critical period of the proceedings” is “from the time of . . . arraignment
until the beginning of . . . trial.”131 Thus, it was necessary for the Court to extend
constitutional rights to the pretrial period.132 The Court concluded that a defendant’s

124. See Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Note, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Brady

Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 3599, 3631 (2013) (noting that the right “to the
disclosure of exculpatory evidence” and “the right to effective assistance of counsel” are “doctrinally
linked” and comparable considering that “the same standard of materiality applies to reviews of both
claims” and, “like Brady, the right to effective assistance was traditionally considered purely a trial right”).

125. See id. at 3631–33 (discussing the impact of ineffective counsel and how it leads to inaccurate and

unreliable convictions for criminal defendants).

126. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
127. See Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 410 (5th Cir. 2018) (Costa, J., dissenting) (“It would

be anomalous if the Strickland right that is found in the trial-focused Sixth Amendment applied to pleas
but the due process Brady right did not.”).

128. Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 590 (2009) (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967)).

These critical stages or interactions include arraignments, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57
(1932); post-indictment lineups, e.g., Wade, 388 U.S. at 218; and post-indictment interrogations, e.g.,
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).

129. 377 U.S. at 201, 206.
130. Id. at 205 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting People v. Waterman, 175 N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y.

1961)).

131. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 57). According to the Massiah Court, this

pretrial period is “when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation (are) vitally
important.” Id. (parenthesis in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 57).

132. See id. at 204 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)) (“[A]

Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at such a trial could surely vouchsafe no
less to an indicted defendant under interrogation by the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding.
Anything less . . . might deny a defendant ‘effective representation by counsel at the only stage when
legal aid and advice would help him.’”).
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inculpatory statements made during uncounseled interrogation are automatically
deemed involuntary and must be excluded from trial.133
However, the Massiah Court left open when precisely the constitutional violation
occurs—at the uncounseled interrogation or when the improperly obtained evidence
is used against the defendant at trial.134 In 2009, the Court confronted this question
in Kansas v. Ventris, which concluded that the constitutional violation occurs at the
time of the uncounseled interrogation.135 The Court noted that the right to counsel
is determined by “the usefulness of counsel to the accused at the particular [pretrial]
proceeding.”136 Thus, the Court deemed it “illogical” to suggest that the constitutional
right to counsel is not violated until evidence is introduced at trial because that is not
when the deprivation of counsel assistance occurs.137
In conjunction, Ventris and Massiah hold that an indicted defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is triggered by the pretrial “critical stage” in which
counsel’s advice would be most “helpful” or “useful” to the defendant.138 This rule is
equally applicable to the Brady context and aligns closely with Part V.A of this
Note.139 First, as proposed in Part V.A, the Massiah Court suggests that a criminal
defendant’s constitutional rights attach at the point of indictment, rather than the

133. See id. at 206–07 (stating that a “defendant’s own incriminating statements, obtained by federal agents”

who “deliberately elicited” the “incriminating words” during an interrogation—formal or informal—
without the defendant’s counsel present, “could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as
evidence against [the defendant] at [their] trial”).

134. See, e.g., Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 591–92 (2009) (explaining that the Massiah opinion “indicat[ed]

that the [constitutional] violation occurred at the moment of the postindictment interrogation . . . [b]ut
the opinion later suggested that the violation occurred only when the improperly optioned evidence was
‘used against [the defendant] at his trial.’”)

135. Id. at 592.
136. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298

(1988)).

137. Id. The Ventris Court emphasized that the defendant was deprived of the assistance of counsel “at the

prior critical stage which produced the inculpatory evidence.” Id. The Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, governed by Massiah’s deliberate elicitation standard, differs from the Fifth Amendment right
to counsel, governed by Miranda’s custodial-interrogation standard. Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S.
519, 524 (2004). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversary judicial
proceedings, with or without a specific request by defendant, and a violation occurs at the pre-trial
moment when information is deliberately elicited from a defendant without counsel present. Id. at 523;
see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (citations omitted) (noting that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is triggered “at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been
initiated . . . ‘[including] by way of . . . indictment’”).

138. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204–05 (citations omitted) (acknowledging that constitutional rights are at play

from the time of arraignment up to trial because that pretrial period is “‘the most critical stage of the
proceedings’”); see also Ventris, 556 U.S. at 592 (citation omitted) (noting that the “‘usefulness of counsel
to the accused at the particular [pretrial] proceeding’” will determine whether the right to counsel
exists) (alteration in original).

139. See infra Part V.A. The proposed Ruiz rule in Part V.A of this Note suggests that the Ruiz decision

should be limited to impeachment information in the context of pre-indictment pleas.
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commencement of trial.140 Second, consistent with the “degree of help” standard in
Ruiz, both Ventris and Massiah look to the degree of “usefulness” and “help” that a
constitutional right can provide to a defendant to determine the existence of the
“critical stage” that triggers constitutional protection.141 The interrogation in Massiah
was a “critical stage” because it subjected the defendant to potential incrimination
through the use of his own statements.142 Arguably, the plea stage is even more
“critical” than an interrogation because a guilty plea results in an automatic guilty
conviction and might lead to a permanent deprivation of liberty. Therefore, the
Court should follow its holding in Ventris and find that a defendant’s constitutional
right to receive Brady evidence is violated at the pretrial moment of suppression, not
simply when the government fails to disclose such evidence at trial.143 Accordingly,
just as a defendant’s confession is automatically involuntary without the presence of
counsel, a defendant’s guilty plea should be equally involuntary without the disclosure
of exculpatory evidence, and any subsequent plea should be constitutionally void.144
Consistent with this conclusion, in 2012, the Court extended the right to effective
assistance of counsel to plea-bargaining.145 In Lafler and Frye, the Court held that a
defendant can challenge a guilty plea when counsel’s ineffective assistance caused the
defendant to reject a plea deal—or to let it expire—and inevitably receive a harsher
penalty.146 The Court concluded that the right to effective assistance of counsel applies
to all “critical stages of the criminal proceeding” in which “defendants cannot be
presumed to make critical decisions without counsel’s advice.”147 A defendant’s pretrial
140. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205 (quoting People v. Waterman, 175 N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y. 1961)) (“Any

secret interrogation of the defendant, from and after the finding of the indictment, without the
protection afforded by the presence of counsel, contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct
of criminal causes and the fundamental rights of persons charged with crime.”).

141. See id. at 204 (quoting Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)) (stating

that it is necessary to afford defendants their Sixth Amendment right to counsel at “the only stage when
legal aid and advice would help [the defendant]”); see also Ventris, 556 U.S. at 592 (quoting Patterson v.
Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298 (1988)) (noting that “‘the usefulness of counsel to the accused at the particular
[pretrial] proceeding” needs to be determined when analyzing “the stringency of the warnings necessary
for a waiver of the assistance of counsel”) (alteration in original).

142. Id. at 204–05.
143. See supra notes 136–39.
144. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206–07.
145. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012).
146. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 161; Frye, 566 U.S. at 139. In Lafler, defense counsel informed the defendant of the

prosecutor’s plea offer, which carried a four-to-seven-year sentence, but advised him to reject it. Lafler,
566 U.S. at 161. The defendant took his attorney’s advice, went to trial, and was “convicted on all counts
and received a mandatory minimum sentence of 185 to 360 months’ imprisonment.” Id. In Frye, the
defense counsel did not inform the defendant about the prosecutor’s two plea offers, including reducing
the felony charge to a misdemeanor charge. Frye, 566 U.S. at 139. The offers expired, remaining
unknown to the defendant, and resulted in the defendant later pleading guilty to a felony charge. Id.

147. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 165; see also Frye, 566 U.S. at 144 (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204) (explaining that

“criminal defendants require effective counsel during plea negotiations;” otherwise, there is a risk of
denying the defendant legal advice during the “only stage [the advice] would help”).
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decision of whether or not to plead guilty, according to the Court, constitutes one of
these “critical decisions.”148 In recognizing that pleas account for nearly 97 percent of
federal criminal convictions, the Court determined that “the negotiation of a plea
bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a
defendant.”149 Finally, the Court noted that the benchmark for determining ineffective
assistance is whether “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process” as to produce an unjust result.150
The Court’s logic in Lafler and Frye is equally applicable to Brady’s exculpatory
evidence. Just as a defendant cannot make the critical decision of whether to plead
guilty without the competent advice of counsel, a defendant is equally deprived of
this ability in the absence of exculpatory evidence.151 Therefore, a prosecutor’s Brady
obligations should be held to the same standard, which is to ensure a proper
functioning of the adversarial process and produce a just outcome. Neither of these
goals can be accomplished without the disclosure of exculpatory evidence before a
defendant makes the critical decision of whether to plead guilty. In accordance with
its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court must extend the right to receive
exculpatory evidence to the “critical point” of plea-bargaining.
VI. CONCLUSION

In a plea-dominated criminal justice system characterized by unequal bargaining
power and vast prosecutorial discretion, justice cannot be measured by mere access to
the courthouse doors.152 In a country where 97 percent of criminal convictions result
in a plea, the preceding plea-bargaining is the critical stage in which a defendant’s
liberty depends on the ability to prove his or her innocence. If Brady means anything,
it means that there is no justification for withholding evidence before the door to the
presumption of innocence is permanently closed. Modern jurisprudence compels the
conclusion that the government must disclose exculpatory evidence at the pleabargaining stage. Any rule to the contrary would be a blatant disregard of legal
precedent, constitutional rights, and the values of the modern criminal justice system.
148. See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 165 (“The [Sixth Amendment] constitutional guarantee [to effective assistance of

counsel] applies to pretrial critical stages that are part of the whole course of a criminal proceeding . . . .”);
see also Frye, 566 U.S. at 140 (“Critical stages [of criminal proceedings] include arraignments,
postindictment interrogations, postindictment lineups, and the entry of a guilty plea.”) (internal
citations omitted).

149. Frye, 566 U.S. at 143–44.
150. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

686 (1984)).

151. See Petegorsky, supra note 124; see also Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 410 (5th Cir. 2018)

(Costa, J., dissenting).

152. The due process right to Brady disclosure is a product of the Court’s “overriding concern with the justice

of the finding of guilt.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (footnote omitted). This concern
is equally apparent in the pretrial context, since the negotiation of plea agreements is “no more foolproof
than full trials to the court or to the jury.” Brady v. United States, 373 U.S. 742, 757–58 (1970).
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